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Abstract
The veil of ignorance has been used often as a tool for recommending
what justice requires with respect to the distribution of wealth. We
complete Harsanyi’s model of the veil of ignorance by appending information permitting interpersonal comparability of welfare. We show
that the veil-of-ignorance conception of John Harsanyi, so completed,
and Ronald Dworkin’s, when modeled formally, recommend wealth
allocations in conflict with the prominently espoused view that priority should be given to the worse oﬀ with respect to wealth allocation.
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Introduction

The construct of the veil of ignorance has been of significant import in political philosophy during the last half century: three prominent writers—John
Harsanyi, John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin—have employed it in diﬀerent
forms. Although these three disagree on exactly how thick the veil should
be, each uses it as a tool to enforce impartiality in the procedure that deduces what the worldly distribution of resources or wealth should be. The
veil-of-ignorance model is putatively impartial because the ‘soul’ or ‘souls’ or
‘parties’ or ‘observer’ who contemplate(s) behind the veil are (is) deprived of
precisely that information that the author deems to be morally arbitrary, to
use the phrase of Rawlsian parlance.
From quite a diﬀerent vantage point, another group of political philosophers (which has a non-empty intersection with the first group) has been
concerned to argue that justice requires that priority be given to the worse
oﬀ in the allocation of wealth. The most extreme form of priority is advocated by Rawls, for whom diﬀerences in amounts of primary goods (wealth
among them) accruing to people are only morally permissible if they maximize the level of (or index of) primary goods accruing to the worst oﬀ (that
is, she who is least endowed with primary goods). Rawls (1971) attempts,
unsuccessfully in our view, to argue for this principle using a veil-of-ignorance
(original position) construction.1
The diﬀerence principle has often been criticized as being too extreme,
and Derek Parfit (1997) has coined the term prioritarianism for the view
that the ‘worse oﬀ’ should be given priority over the ‘better oﬀ’ with respect
to resource allocation, but that the former need not necessarily receive the
extreme priority that characterizes maximin (the diﬀerence principle). In a
welfarist setting, prioritarianism is usually characterized as a social welfare
function with strictly convex upper contour sets. The boundaries of prioritarianism are maximin on one side, and utilitarianism on the other. (See, for
1

See Roemer (1996) for one discussion of the inadequacy of Rawls’s argument from the

original position.
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example, Roemer, 2004).
Other philosophers who would identify themselves with either a prioritarian or egalitarian or maximin view include Brian Barry (1989, 1995), G.A.
Cohen (1992), Larry Temkin (1993), and Thomas Scanlon (1998). There
are surely many more. We include together the three views here italicized
because prioritarianism is a weakening of egalitarianism and the diﬀerence
principle: if a rule is egalitarian or maximin it is surely prioritarian.2 Those
who advocate priority but not maximin do so usually because they consider
the sacrifices of implementing the diﬀerence principle too great—sacrifices
borne by the better oﬀ.
In this paper, we show that the veil of ignorance, when formulated in a
rigorous way, is inconsistent with prioritarianism: to be precise, it will often
recommend distributions of wealth that give priority to the better oﬀ.3 We
focus on the conceptions of the veil of ignorance outlined by Harsanyi (1953,
1977) and Dworkin (1981b). In the former case, we complete the theory that
Harsanyi began and then show its anti-prioritarian consequences. In the
latter case, we show the anti-prioritarian nature of a simple model reflecting
Dworkin’s insurance mechanism.
The concept of one person’s being worse oﬀ than another is one, in the
philosophical literature, which presupposes the possibility of making interpersonal welfare comparisons. Therefore, such comparisons will be assumed
to be possible in our formulation of the problem. To anticipate what we
define in what follows, we will say that one person is worse oﬀ, or less able,
than another if the first transforms resources (for us, ‘wealth’) into welfare
less eﬃciently than the other.
2

One could argue that egalitarianism does not imply priority, in the sense that (2, 2) is

more egalitarian than (3, 4), but the worse oﬀ person is better oﬀ in the second allocation
than in the first. Thus priority could recommend (3, 4) but equality (2, 2). One could,
however, also argue that in (2, 2) the first person is given greater priority than in (3, 4).
We pursue this no further.
3
An early form of this work is available in Roemer (2002); that article has an error,
which is corrected here.
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There is a recent literature which also is concerned with completing
Harsanyi’s veil-of-ignorance approach (Karni, 1998, 2003; Dhillon and Mertens,
1999; and Segal, 2000).4 In the conclusion, we briefly contrast our approach
to this literature.

2

The Harsanyi veil of ignorance

2.1

Harsanyi’s original first step

In 1953, John Harsanyi proposed the first precise model of the veil of ignorance.5 Suppose there are n individuals, each of whom possesses von
Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) preferences over wealth lotteries. Denote the
vNM utility functions on wealth for these people by v1 , v 2 , ..., v n . There is an
amount of wealth W to be divided among them. What is the just division?
Harsanyi proposes to conceptualize a single impartial observer (IO) who will
become one of these people, with equal probability of becoming each one.
How would such an observer allocate the wealth?
The IO’s data, for Harsanyi, consist of the set {v 1 , v 2 , ..., v n , W }.

Denote by (i, W ) the extended prospect that means ‘becoming person i
with wealth W .’ Harsanyi proposes that the IO, to solve his problem, must
itself possess a vNM utility function U defined on extended prospects. (That
is, it must be able to evaluate lotteries on extended prospects.) We can
then represent the ‘birth lottery’ through which the IO becomes a particular
person, and in which the distribution of wealth among the individuals is
(W 1 , W 2 , ..., W n ), by
µ
¶
1
1
1 1
2
n
l=
◦ (1, W ), ◦ (2, W ), ..., ◦ (n, W ) .
n
n
n
This is to be read, “With probability 1/n, the extended prospect (1, W 1 )
is realized (and the IO becomes person 1 with wealth W 1 ), with probability
4

We thank a referee for alerting us to the connections between our work and this

literature.
5
See Harsanyi (1977) or Weymark (1989) for a more detailed presentation of this model.
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1/n the extended prospect (2, W 2 ) is realized, and so on”. Now the utility
the IO receives from this lottery is, by the expected utility property, equal
to:

n
X
1
i=1

n

· U(i, W i )

(1)

and so the IO needs only find the distribution of wealth that maximizes
P i
expression (1) subject to the constraint that
W = W . That distribution
is the one it would choose, and therefore, that justice recommends.

The problem, then, is to deduce what the function U is. Harsanyi takes
an axiomatic approach to this problem. He assumes what he calls:
The Principle of Acceptance: For each fixed i ∈ {1, ..., n}, the function U(i, ·) represents the same vNM preferences on wealth lotteries as vi (·)

represents.

Now the vNM theorem tells us that any two vNM utility functions that
represent the same preferences must be positive aﬃne transformations of each
other. Therefore:
For all W and i, there exist ai > 0 and bi such that
U(i, W ) = ai · v i (W ) + bi

(2)

Substituting formulae (2) into (1), we have that
n
n
n
n
X
X
¢ 1 X
1
1¡ i i i
1 X i
i
i
i i
i
a ·v (W )+ ·
b (3)
·U(i, W ) =
a · v (W ) + b = ·
n
n
n
n
i=1
i=1
i=1
i=1
P i
Maximizing the right-hand side of (3) is equivalent to maximizing
a ·

vi (W i ). That is the end of Harsanyi’s argument: the IO must maximize some
positive weighted sum of the vNM utilities of the individual persons.

2.2

Amending Harsanyi’s first step to allow for interpersonal comparisons of welfare

Harsanyi’s argument is in our view unfinished, for he has provided no wellargued way of determining the values of the positive numbers {ai : i =
5

1, 2, ...n}, so he has not determined the vNM preferences of the IO.6 Furthermore, there is no way to derive these values from the information that
Harsanyi has provided to the IO, and his axioms.
A moment’s thought will show why this is so. The only information the IO
has, consists in the profile of risk preferences of the individuals, and the total
wealth to be allocated. But to decide whether it would rather become Alan
with $1000 or Barbara with $3000, the IO must be able to compare how well
oﬀ Alan is with $1000 with how well oﬀ Barbara is with $3000. (Or it must
have some independent reason to prefer to be Alan, say.) There is no way the
IO can make such comparisons with the information Harsanyi has given it.
There is, in Harsanyi’s specification of the problem, absolutely no information
permitting interpersonal welfare comparisons. The vNM preferences of the
individuals are purely ordinal preferences that measure ‘utility’ in a noncomparable way across persons.7
Clearly, if the IO were to possess vNM preferences on the lotteries on
the space of extended prospects, such preferences would imply the existence
of something that looks like an interpersonal welfare ordering, for the IO.
For let such preferences exist and denote them by %; then the statement
“(i, W ) % (j, W 0 )” which means “the IO would weakly prefer to be person i
with wealth W to being person j with wealth W 0 ” is similar, though surely
not identical, to the statement “person i with wealth W is at least as well
oﬀ as person j with wealth W 0 .” Of course, the second statement presupposes that interpersonal comparisons of welfare are meaningful, while the
6

Indeed, Harsanyi asserts that the weights of individual vNM utilities must be equal

to reflect impartiality. We reject this view: if a preference relation is represented by a
weighted sum of individual utilities, then there is a feasible manipulation of the individual
utility functions that leads to a new representation of the preference relation as a weighted
sum of individual utilities with equal weights.
7
Many people are confused about this claim. VNM preferences are ordinal preferences
on lotteries. There happens to be a very useful cardinal representation of those preferences,
which allows us to calculate the utility of a lottery in a very simple way (by factoring out
the probabilities). But the preferences are purely ordinal and non-comparable across
persons. For further discussion, see Roemer (1996, chapter 4).
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first statement does not: in the absence of the ability to make such comparisons the IO might have another decision procedure which leads it to its view
about the relative merits of being person i or j with the associated wealths.
Our proposal is simple: we will amend Harsanyi’s model by assuming that
it is possible to perform interpersonal welfare comparisons. To this end, we
assume that
There is a complete order on extended prospects, denoted R, and for
all i, j, W there exists W 0 such that (i, W )I(j, W 0 ), where I denotes the
symmetric part of the order R.
The statement (1, W 1 )R(2, W 2 ) means ‘person 1 with wealth W 1 is at
least as well oﬀ as person 2 with wealth W 2 ’. This order is to be thought
of as a fact about the world, a statement about how the persons experience
life: it is not —yet— the subjective preference order of the IO.
We now append an axiom concerning the relationship between the IO’s
ordering of extended prospects and the interpersonal ordering R, that we
name:
The Principle of Neutrality: (i, W i ) % (j, W j ) ⇔ (i, W i )R(j, W j ).
In other words, the IO weakly prefers one extended prospect to another if
and only if the person in the first extended prospect is at least as well-oﬀ (in
terms of the interpersonally comparable coin called welfare or well-being) as
the person in the second extended prospect. We call this ‘neutrality’ because
it asserts that the IO brings no external considerations to bear concerning
what person it would like to become: it only follows the dictates of the
interpersonally comparable attribute called welfare or well-being, ignoring
all other traits these individuals have (such as their sex, race, nationality,
religious preference, or political views).8
8

It is worth noting that our proposal, similar that might appear, does not follow the

so-called extended preference approach, formally elaborated by Arrow (1963, 1977), Suppes
(1966), Sen (1970), Kolm (1972), Suzumura (1983) and Mongin (2001) among others. This
approach endows each member of the society with both an actual preference relation defined on the set of allocations (social states), and a relation defined on extended prospects.

7

We view the principle of neutrality as a principle of impartiality as well,
for the reason stated above. Neutrality, that is, is a kind of impartiality.
Of course, because information on the sex, race, religion, etc., of individuals
is unavailable in our specification of the data of the problem, it is hard to
see what partiality could mean on these environments —that is, given only
the above data, the IO must necessarily ignore these other attributes of
individuals in the world. Nevertheless, partiality could mean that the IO
would prefer to be realized as one person i over another person j because he
likes to have the risk preferences of i more than having the risk preferences of
j. The principle of neutrality excludes that kind of partiality: for it requires
the IO to choose between extended prospects only on the basis of the welfare
he would experience in them.
2.2.1

An impossibility result

The data available to the IO are now {v1 , v 2 , ..., v n , W , R}, and the axioms

that relate his own preference order to the data are those of Acceptance and
Neutrality. We will now show that these data and axioms together lead to
an impossibility theorem.
To do so, we first introduce another concept. Let {Wa1 , Wa2 , ..., Wan } be

an equal-welfare distribution of wealth: that is a distribution such that
(i, Wai )I(j, Waj ) for every pair i, j,

where I is the symmetric part of the order R. Let there be two more equalwelfare distributions of wealth denoted {Wbi }ni=1 and {Wci }ni=1 , and suppose

that these three distributions of wealth represent three welfare levels in increasing order of welfare, and so it follows that for each i, Wai < Wbi < Wci ,
because we assume that welfare is strictly increasing in wealth.
We again invoke the vNM theorem, which tells us that for each person i
In our approach, individuals posses preferences over wealth lotteries but not over extended
prospects. The IO is the one possessing preferences over extended prospects.

8

there is a unique probability pi such that:
vi (Wbi ) = pi · vi (Wai ) + (1 − pi ) · v i (Wci )

(4)

In general, of course, the probabilities pi will diﬀer across individuals.
The more risk averse an individual is, the lower will pi be. We say that:
The individuals in the world {v1 , v 2 , ..., v n , W , R} are risk isomorphic if,

for any choice of the three equal-welfare distributions {Wai }, {Wbi } and {Wci },

the numbers {pi : i = 1, . . . , n} defined by (4) are identical for all i = 1, ..., n.
What this means is that these individuals have identical risk preferences
over welfare lotteries, where welfare is the coin of interpersonal comparability.
Risk isomorphism is a property of our environments: it requires as data
both the profile of vNM preferences and the interpersonal ordering R. Clearly,
it is a singular case, which will rarely if ever hold in ‘real worlds.’
We have the following:
Theorem 1 There is a vNM preference order on extended prospects (for
the IO) that satisfies the principles of acceptance and neutrality if and only
if individuals in the world {v1 , v 2 , ..., v n , W , R} are risk isomorphic. If so,

the order is unique and represented by the vNM utility function on extended
prospects:
U (i, W ) =

v i (W ) − vi (Wai )
,
v i (Wbi ) − vi (Wai )

(5)

where {Wai }ni=1 and {Wbi }ni=1 are any two equal-welfare distributions of wealth

such that Wbi > Wai .9

Theorem 1 is basically an impossibility theorem. It says that, in what
is the usual case (of risk non-isomorphism), the Harsanyi veil of ignorance,
9

This is a correction of the stated theorem in Roemer (2002). I (Roemer) there incor-

rectly assumed something that implied that all environments were risk isomorphic, and
so I claimed that the principles of neutrality and acceptance always characterized unique
vNM preferences for the IO. Fortunately, the examples of that paper are correct, as they
are all examples where risk isomorphism holds.

9

amended by information on interpersonal comparability and the principle
of neutrality, is an incoherent thought experiment. In the singular case of
risk-isomorphism, we uniquely determine the preferences of the IO (that
is, we solve for the coeﬃcients {ai } of equation (3).) In particular, if the

environment is risk isomorphic, we know the basic procedure by which the
IO selects the allocation of wealth. Formally,
Basic procedure: Let {Wai }ni=1 and {Wbi }ni=1 be any two equal-welfare distri-

butions of wealth such that Wbi > Wai . If individuals in the world {v1 , v 2 , ..., v n , W , R}

are risk isomorphic, then the IO selects an allocation ω B = (W 1 , W 2 , ..., W n )
that maximizes

n
X
1 v i (W i ) − v i (Wai )
·
,
n v i (Wbi ) − v i (Wai )
i=1
P
subject to the condition that ni=1 W i = W .

2.2.2

(6)

Deep imaginative empathy

Theorem 1 shows that in the risk non-isomorphism case, there are no vNM
preferences for the IO. However, we can propose a procedure by which the IO
might decide upon a distribution of wealth in any (risk-isomorphic or not)
environment. This procedure uses an idea that Harsanyi (1977, page 51)
refers to as ‘imaginative empathy’.
Denote the individuals by 1, 2, . . . , n. The IO first ‘steps in the shoes’ of
any person i, and chooses the wealth distribution i would choose, if i always
converts wealth given to other people into the welfare-equivalent wealth for
herself (i). We define this precisely as follows. For any pair (j, W ) and any
agent i define σij (W ) by (j, W j )I(i, σ ij (W )). That is, σ ij (W ) is the wealth
that i requires to reach the same level of welfare as j achieves with wealth
W j . If the distribution of wealth being contemplated is (W 1 , W 2 , ..., W n )
then the IO, placing herself in i’s shoes, would evaluate the birth lottery as
having expected utility

n
X
1
j=1

n

· vi (σ ij (W j )).
10

(7)

Thus the IO, using i’s risk preferences, asks how she would feel as any
person j, given the wealth j gets in the distribution: to do so, the IO must
convert j’s wealth to the welfare—equivalent wealth for i, since the IO is
evaluating everything from i’s perspective.
Harsanyi used the phrase imaginative empathy for the compassion the
IO feels as it contemplates taking on the risk preferences of diﬀerent people.
But, since Harsanyi did not deal with interpersonal comparisons of welfare,
his imaginative empathy referred to the IO’s taking on only the risk preferences of diﬀerent people, as modeled by his Principle of Acceptance. The
formulation (7) is one we call deep imaginative empathy, because, when stepping in the shoes of person i, the IO takes on not only i’s risk preferences,
but imagines how i would feel in terms of welfare if he (i) were to be realized
as any person j with a given wealth level W j . Person i would experience j’s
wealth level W j , which is equivalent to i’s having the wealth level σij (W j ).
Denote by ω i = (Wi1 , ..., Win ) a feasible distribution of wealth that maxPn
k
imizes expression (7) subject to the condition that
k=1 Wi = W . Se-

quentially, the IO now performs this computation, taking on every person’s

viewpoint. This produces n wealth distributions ω 1 , ..., ω n . We propose that
P
the IO takes the average of these distributions, n1 · ωi , as its recommended

distribution.10 Formally:

General procedure: In the world {v 1 , v 2 , ..., v n , W , R}, the IO selects an
allocation

1 X
·
ωi ,
(8)
n
where, for all i = 1, . . . , n, ω i = (Wi1 , ..., Win ) is an allocation that maximizes
P
expression (7) subject to the condition that nk=1 Wik = W .
ωG =

Note that the general procedure just described provides a choice corre-

spondence for the IO: to any environment {v1 , v 2 , ..., v n , W , R} it associates

a (not necessarily singleton) set of distributions of wealth. So does the basic

procedure described in (6), when the environment is risk isomorphic. The
10

Indeed, as we will see in the proof of Theorem 2, the IO can take any convex combi-

nation of these wealth distributions.
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general procedure, however, can be performed for any environment, risk isomorphic or not. The next result shows that it is a generalization of the
basic procedure: that is, if the environment is risk-isomorphic, the general
procedure selects the allocations obtained maximizing the IO’s vNM utility
function provided in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 If individuals in the world {v 1 , v 2 , ..., v n , W , R} are risk isomor-

phic, then the following statements hold:

(i) If the basic procedure yields a unique allocation of wealth then the
general procedure yields the same allocation.
(ii) If the basic procedure yields more than one allocation of wealth, and
all the vi functions are concave, then the general procedure yields the same
set of allocations.

2.3

The anti-prioritarian nature of the Harsanyi veil
of ignorance

We now show the anti-prioritarian nature of the Harsanyi veil of ignorance
by means of a simple example. There are two individuals, Andrea and Bob.
They are each risk neutral. We may therefore take them to have the same
linear vNM utility function, namely
v A (W ) = v B (W ) = W .
Let us suppose that the interpersonal welfare order is given by (Andrea, W )I(Bob, 2W );
that is, Bob always needs twice the wealth of Andrea to achieve the same
welfare level as she. It is easy to see that this environment is risk isomorphic.
We now compute what the IO recommends for this example. Suppose that
W = 1, so a distribution of wealth is represented by (W, 1 − W ) where the

first component goes to Andrea and the second to Bob. The IO must choose

W . We know that U (A, W ) = U(B, 2W ) by the principle of neutrality. Now
the IO must choose W to
1
1
maximize U(A, W ) + U(B, 1 − W ).
2
2
12

By the formula just given we can write this as
1
1−W
1
)
max U(A, W ) + U(A,
2
2
2
But by the principle of acceptance, this is equivalent to maximizing
1 1−W
1 W
1
W+ ·
= +
2
2
2
4
4

(9)

which is achieved at W = 1: the IO would give all the wealth to Andrea.
Now in this environment, we consider Bob to be disabled with respect
to Andrea: he requires more wealth than she to receive any given level of
welfare. Thus, the Harsanyi veil of ignorance gives all the wealth to the able
person. If we consider more than two individuals in this example, and they
can be ordered with respect to ‘ability’, then the Harsanyi veil of ignorance
assigns all the wealth to the most able individual(s).
What happens if we alter the risk preferences in the above Andrea-Bob
example so that the individuals are risk averse? For small degrees of risk
aversion, it continues to be the case that our amended Harsanyi veil delivers
more wealth to the able agent, although it will deliver some wealth to both
agents. Only for large degrees of risk aversion does the veil of ignorance assign
more wealth to the disabled person. Therefore, our example has shown that
the veil of ignorance, in general, violates priority. Note that, by Theorem 2,
it follows that the general procedure is also anti-prioritarian, because in the
special case of risk-isomorphism, we know it is anti-prioritarian.
Of course, the interpretation matters here. A situation where Bob requires twice Andrea’s wealth to reach her level of welfare could also be due
to Bob’s having expensive tastes for which we hold him responsible, and in
that case, we might not be so disturbed by the conclusion.11 But we insist
that that is not the problem we are here studying. We are discussing worlds
where people diﬀer in their ability to convert wealth into well-being, through
no fault of their own.
11

The issue of expensive tastes is focal in the contemporary literature on distributive

justice: see, for the locus classicus, Dworkin (1981a).
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We now assert that priority requires that disabled individuals receive at
least as much wealth as able ones. That is our definition of priority for these
worlds. In the environments under discussion, we have a clear way of deciding
what it means to say ‘i is worse oﬀ than j’ in the sense of Parfit: it means
that i is disabled relative to j, which means ‘i requires more wealth than j
to reach any given welfare level’.
We have now provided the argument that the veil of ignorance, completed
from Harsanyi’s first step by the addition of more information and a new
axiom, is anti-prioritarian, in the sense that it fails in general to assign at
least as much wealth to disabled agents as to able ones. Although Harsanyi’s
assumption that the IO must possess vNM preferences is, we believe, too
strong —in the sense that it is inconsistent with the very reasonable axioms
of acceptance and neutrality on our domain of problems, except in a singular
case— we have produced a proposal for what the IO should do in the general
case (of non-risk-isomorphism), and it also is anti-prioritarian.12

3

The Dworkin veil of ignorance

Ronald Dworkin (1981b) outlined a conception of the veil of ignorance that
is coherent and can be formally modeled. In Dworkin’s view, individuals are
to be held responsible for their preferences, but not for their ‘resources.’ The
veil of ignorance is supposed to shield people from knowledge of the characteristics they possess which are ‘morally arbitrary’ —here, their resources— but
not from characteristics which they ‘own’ —here, their preferences. Thus, behind Dworkin’s veil, the soul representing a person knows his person’s vNM
12

One might try to defend Harsanyi’s veil of ignorance and prioritarianism by saying

that, when such monumental issues are at stake as one’s wealth for a lifetime, rational
individuals would be highly risk averse, thus excluding from the domain of possible worlds,
profiles of risk preferences which generate the conflict with priority. We are skeptical. Real
people frequently take life-threatening risks that indicate that they do not have excessively
high degrees of risk aversion. It is unappealing to say that the only rational persons are
the ones who are extremely risk averse.
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preferences, but does not know the worldly wealth or the ability his person
has. Dworkin’s innovation was to propose that souls behind this veil of ignorance enter into insurance contracts with each other, to seek indemnity
against bad luck in the birth lottery. In this section, we propose a model of
this insurance market.
Here we again present a two-person example, and our model of Dworkin’s
thought experiment. Suppose we again have Andrea and Bob, and Bob is
disabled with respect to Andrea—to wit, he requires 2W in wealth to reach
the same welfare level as Andrea reaches with W . For the sake of variety, we
will now suppose that Andrea and Bob have the same risk preferences over
wealth and their vNM utility function is given by
v(W ) =

√
W.

This time, Andrea and Bob are risk averse.
As we said, Dworkin wishes to hold persons responsible for their risk
preferences, but not for their talents. In this case, talent is the ability to
convert wealth into welfare. Thus, behind the veil of ignorance he constructs,
the soul representing a person knows its person’s vNM utility function, but
does not know its person’s talent.
Behind the veil of ignorance, there are two souls—call them α and β—
who represent Andrea and Bob, respectively. Each soul knows the welfare
producing capacities of Andrea and Bob, and each believes that it will become
Andrea or Bob with equal probability (or, to paraphrase, that it will acquire
Andrea’s and Bob’s talent with equal probability).
Thus there are two states of the world, from the viewpoint behind the
veil, as follows:
State α becomes β becomes
1

Andrea

Bob

2

Bob

Andrea

In state 1, soul α becomes Andrea and soul β becomes Bob; in state 2,
the assignments of souls to persons are the other way around. We know
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that state 1 will occur, but the souls behind the veil assign a probability of
one-half to each state’s occurring.
We assume that, in the real world, Andrea has an endowment W A of
wealth and Bob has an endowment of W B .
Behind the veil, the souls purchase insurance against bad luck in the
birth lottery. We assume (after Dworkin) that the souls have equal purchasing power for insurance. This is where equality enters importantly into
Dworkin’s view. It does not matter how much purchasing power they each
have: we shall say each has zero initially. This means that the only way
to purchase insurance for indemnity in one state is to sell insurance for the
other’s indemnity in the other state.
We model the insurance market as follows. There are two commodities:
the first is a contract which will deliver $1 to the holder should state 1 occur,
and the second is a contract which will deliver $1 to the holder should state
2 occur. Let us denote the prices (behind the veil) for these two commodities
by p1 and p2 . Note that these commodities are purchased behind the veil,
using the currency that exists there, which we call clamshell currency, to
follow Dworkin’s usage.
Denote by xα1 and xα2 the amount of commodity 1 and commodity 2,
respectively, that soul α purchases. If x is positive, that means she purchases
contracts that will deliver to her x dollars if the state of the subscript occurs;
if x is negative, that means she will deliver x dollars to someone else should
that state occur. The budget constraint for soul α is
p1 xα1 + p2 xα2 = 0,
which means that the amount of commodity 1 she can purchase must cost
exactly the income she generates by selling commodity 2 (or, the other
way around). This constraint derives from the fact that her endowment
of ‘clamshells’ behind the veil is zero. If the soul faces prices (p1 , p2 ) then
her optimization problem is as follows: choose xa1 and xa2 to maximize
r
1p A
1 W B + xα2
α
W + x1 +
(10)
subject to p1 xα1 + p2 xα2 = 0.
2
2
2
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The objective she maximizes is her expected utility, but to understand
it, we must again invoke the notion of deep imaginative empathy. The expression under the first radical is clear: this is what her wealth will be if
she becomes Andrea (state 1). The expression under the second radical is
trickier. In state 2, she (the soul α) becomes Bob; the wealth she would then
have is W B + xα2 . However, she must evaluate this wealth from Andrea’s
viewpoint—and by hypothesis the welfare this amount of wealth generates for
Bob is exactly the welfare that one-half this amount generates for Andrea.
So deep imaginative empathy gives us the objective in (10).
In other words, soul α uses Andrea’s vNM utility function to evaluate
lotteries over wealth, and she converts wealth that she would experience as
Bob into welfare-equivalent wealth, for Andrea. The similarity to our general
procedure in the last section should be clear.
In like manner, the optimization problem for soul β is to choose xβ1 and
xβ2 to maximize
q
q
1
1
W B + xβ1 +
2(W A + xβ2 ) subject to p1 xβ1 + p2 xβ2 = 0.
2
2
Note that, if soul β becomes Andrea, he must evaluate her wealth in terms
of the welfare-equivalent wealth for Bob.
An equilibrium in the insurance market consists in:
(1) a pair of prices p1 and p2 , and
(2) commodity demands (xα1 , xα2 , xβ1 , xβ1 ) such that the markets for both
commodities clear, that is: xα1 + xβ1 = 0 = xα2 + xβ2 .
There is a unique equilibrium13 in this market. It is:
p1 = p2 = 1
2W B − W A α
, x2 = −xα1
xα1 =
3
W A − 2W B β
xβ1 =
, x2 = −xβ1 .
3
13

To be precise, the demands and supplies are uniquely determined. The prices can be

any pair of equal positive numbers.
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As we said, we know that, in the event, state 1 occurs; this means that the
final wealth levels (under the Dworkinian tax scheme) must be
2
· (W B + W A )
3
1
= W B + xβ1 = · (W B + W A )
3

W A,f inal = W A + xα1 =
W B,f inal

Thus, disabled Bob ends up with one-third of the total wealth, and able
Andrea ends up with two-thirds of the total wealth.
In other words, the Dworkinian insurance market is in general antiprioritarian. It does not (in general) assign at least as much wealth to the
disabled individual as to the able individual.
This section and the last one do not prove that all veil-of-ignorance models
are necessarily anti-prioritarian: we have established, however, that the two
most coherent proposals in the philosophical literature for conceptualizing the
veil of ignorance are so, at least under what we consider to be a reasonable
addition to those models, namely, information on interpersonal comparability
of welfare. Without such comparability, the notion of priority cannot be
defined.

4

Discussion

We are concerned with the following syllogism:
A. Justice requires impartiality;
B. Impartiality, as far as justice is concerned, is properly modeled by
veil-of-ignorance thought experiments;
C. Veil-of-ignorance thought experiments in general recommend antiprioritarian allocations.
Therefore,
D. Justice is not prioritarian.
A has a long intellectual history; it is an axiom we do not challenge. C is,
so far as we can tell, a fact about veil-of-ignorance models. We have tried to
convince the reader of its validity in this paper. We believe that the ethical
18

statement D is invalid: we hold that justice is prioritarian. We therefore
must reject the premise B.
Those who reject D could avail themselves of alternatives to rejecting B,
such as:
1. Constructing a model of the veil of ignorance that does not conflict
with prioritarianism, thus negating C. Perhaps this can be done. Our
approach has been to formalize two of the best models of the veil of
ignorance oﬀered in the last half century and to show they are antiprioritarian.14 But this is not a proof that C is true.
2. Refining the definition of impartiality to exclude the veil of ignorance.
Perhaps this can be done. We take this to be the strategy of Brian Barry
(1989, 1995)—how else could he claim that justice is (or as) impartiality,
and also believe that justice is prioritarian or more? Perhaps this is
also Scanlon’s (1998) strategy: we leave this for others to judge.
There is also the possibility of:
3. Admitting that a second principle, besides impartiality, is required to
characterize justice —examples are solidarity, fraternity or reciprocity—
and then to argue that impartiality, in conjunction with the new principle, excludes anti-prioritarian allocation rules, like the veil of ignorance.
Approach #3 would be one way of elaborating the rejection of premise B
above.
In part 2 of this research project, we do not carry out either strategy 2
or 3 above, desirable as they may be, but rather do something else, which
we view as important: we explore what allocation rules are consistent with
impartiality, priority, and a third principle, solidarity, on a space of important
allocation problems.15 Indeed, we characterize such rules.
14

We have not studied Binmore’s (1994) formulation of the veil. Rawls’ (1971) proposal

has many problems, which we discuss elsewhere (e.g., Roemer, 1996; forthcoming).
15
Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2005)
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We conclude by briefly relating our analysis of the Harsanyi veil of ignorance to the recent literature that we cited in the Introduction. We reiterate
our central point: we have completed the Harsanyi veil-of-ignorance model
by appending two things: information on interpersonal comparability —to be
thought of as a fact about the world— and an axiom, relating the IO’s vNM
preference order on lotteries on extended prospects to this information. Our
proposal might appear to be similar to the proposal of Karni (1998) which,
besides accepting the principle of acceptance, formulates an axiom of impartiality on the IO preferences. Karni claims this axiom ‘renders meaningful
interpersonal comparisons of variation in ordinal welfare’.16 Karni (1988)
obtains a representation theorem for the IO preferences, in a more general
framework than ours, whose utility function is similar in form to what we
obtain in Theorem 1. It is:17
U ∗ (i, W ) =

vi (W ) − vi (0)
.
vi (W ) − vi (0)

The preferences on extended prospects represented by U ∗ are the same
as the preferences represented by U in our Theorem 1 if and only if:
(a) all individuals derive equal welfare from zero wealth, and
(b) all individuals derive equal welfare from receiving the entire wealth
of the society.
In our environments, this is clearly a singular case. Now U ∗ clearly satisfies the principle of acceptance. Therefore, by our Theorem 1, it is the
generically true that U ∗ violates the principle of neutrality, on our environments. That is, when interpersonal comparability is meaningful (i.e., the order R exists) Karni’s impartial observer will not generally rank two extended
prospects as equally desirable if the individuals in them receive equal welfare.
We consider this an undesirable feature of Karni’s approach. From our viewpoint, Karni’s IO is ‘partial’ in the sense that he must generally bring other
16
17

See also Karni (2003).
Karni works on a more general space of states of the world: we have here specialized

his result to our environments, where the states are wealth distributions, and individual
vNM utility functions on wealth are assumed to be strictly increasing.
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considerations than ‘welfare’ to bear in deciding between extended prospects.
Dhillon and Mertens (1999) and Segal (2000) also derive preferences for
the IO which, in our environment, specialize to the representation U ∗ above.
They do not, however, claim that interpersonal comparisons can be made
in their worlds, and so we cannot levy against their models the criticism we
have just made of Karni’s.
As our concern in this paper has been to explore the relationship of the veil
of ignorance to prioritarianism, and since the concept of priority assumes that
interpersonal comparisons are possible, those comparisons must be possible
in our formulation of the problem. We did not, however, argue that adding
such information is the only way to complete Harsanyi’s approach, although,
it need hardly be said, we find it a compelling one.

5

Appendix

We provide in this Appendix the proofs of the theorems in Section 2.
Proof of the “if part” in Theorem 1
Suppose first that individuals in the world {v1 , v 2 , ..., v n , W , R} are risk

isomorphic. Let U be the vNM utility function on extended prospects defined
as in (5). Clearly, acceptance holds: for each i, U (i, ·) is a positive aﬃne
transformation of v i . We also show that neutrality holds.

Let (i, W )I(j, W 0 ). We show that U (i, W ) = U(j, W 0 ). To do so, let
{Wai }ni=1 and {Wbi }ni=1 be two equal-welfare distributions of wealth such that
Wbi > Wai . We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: Wai ≤ W ≤ Wbi

By risk isomorphism, there exists p ∈ [0, 1] such that
vi (W ) = p·v i (Wai )+(1−p)·v i (Wbi ) and vj (W 0 ) = p·v j (Waj )+(1−p)·vj (Wbj ).
Thus,
U (i, W ) =

vj (W 0 ) − v j (Waj )
v i (W ) − vi (Wai )
0
=
1
−
p
=
j
j = U (j, W ).
i
i
vi (Wbi ) − vi (Wai )
v (Wb ) − v (Wa )
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Case 2: W < Wai < Wbi
By risk isomorphism, there exists p ∈ [0, 1] such that
vi (Wai ) = p·v i (W )+(1−p)·v i (Wbi ) and vj (Waj ) = p·vj (W 0 )+(1−p)·vj (Wbj ).
Thus,
U(i, W ) =

−1 + p v j (W 0 ) − v j (Waj )
v i (W ) − vi (Wai )
=
=
= U(j, W 0 ).
v i (Wbi ) − vi (Wai )
p
vi (Wbj ) − v i (Waj )

Case 3: Wai < Wbi < W
By risk isomorphism, there exists p ∈ [0, 1] such that
vi (Wbi ) = p·v i (Wai )+(1−p)·vi (W ) and vj (Wbj ) = p·vj (Waj )+(1−p)·v j (W 0 ).
Thus,
U (i, W ) =

1
vj (W 0 ) − v j (Waj )
v i (W ) − vi (Wai )
0
=
=
j
j = U (j, W ).
i
i
v i (Wbi ) − vi (Wai )
1−p
v (Wb ) − v (Wa )

b W 0 ), where R
b is the strict part of the order
Suppose now that (i, W )R(j,

R. Define W ∗ by (i, W ∗ )I(j, W 0 ), i.e., W ∗ = σ ij (W 0 ). We now know that
U(i, W ∗ ) = U(j, W 0 ). But since v i (W ) > v i (W ∗ ), substitution into the

definition of U (i, W ) immediately shows that U(i, W ) > U(j, W 0 ) which
shows that neutrality holds.
If we take two other equal-welfare wealth distributions from the ones
cai } and {W
ci }, the new function, call it U
b , thereby
chosen here, call them {W
b

defined, is an aﬃne transformation of the function U. To see this, six diﬀerent

cases need to be analyzed. We only show one. The remaining cases are
analogous.
cai < W
ci < W i
Case 1: Wai < W
b
b

By risk isomorphism, there exists p, q ∈ [0, 1] such that

cai ) = p·vi (Wai )+(1−p)·v i (Wbi ) and vi (W
cbi ) = q ·vi (Wai )+(1−q)·v i (Wbi ).
vi (W
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Then,

where k =

1
p−q

and c =

b (i, W ) = k · U(i, W ) − c,
U

1−p
.
p−q

Thus, we have shown that there is a vNM preference ordering on extended
prospects for the IO that is well-defined, independent of the choice of equalwelfare wealth distributions, and that satisfies acceptance and neutrality.
We show now that the order is unique. Assume there exists another order
that satisfies the principles of acceptance and neutrality. By acceptance, this
b satisfying
new order should be represented by a vNM utility function U
b W ) = αi · v i (W ) + β i for all i and W , and for some αi > 0 and β i .
U(i,

Let {Wai }ni=1 and {Wbi }ni=1 be two equal-welfare distributions of wealth.

Then, by neutrality, there exist two numbers Ka and Kb such that

Ka = αi · v i (Wai ) + β i and Kb = αi · v i (Wbi ) + β i , for all i = 1, ..., n.
Thus,
αi =
Consequently,

Kb − Ka
i
v (Wbi ) − v i (Wai )

and β i = Ka − αi · v i (Wai ).

b (i, W ) = αi · vi (W ) + β i = (Kb − Ka ) · U(i, W ) + Ka ,
U

b an aﬃne transformation of the function U .
which says that U
Proof of the “only if part” in Theorem 1

Suppose now that risk isomorphism does not hold. Then, there exist three
equal-welfare distributions of wealth denoted {Wai }ni=1 , {Wbi }ni=1 and {Wci }ni=1

such that Wci > Wbi > Wai for all i = 1, ..., n, and two individuals i, j such
that:
vi (Wbi ) = pi · vi (Wai ) + (1 − pi ) · v i (Wci ),
and
vj (Wbj ) = pj · vj (Waj ) + (1 − pj ) · v j (Wcj ),
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with pi 6= pj . Thus,
pi =

v j (Wbj ) − v j (Waj )
vi (Wbi ) − vi (Wai )
=
6
= pj
vi (Wci ) − vi (Wai )
v j (Wcj ) − v j (Waj )

(11)

Now, if a vNM preference order on lotteries on extended prospects satisfying acceptance and neutrality exists, and U is a vNM utility function
representing it, then
U (i, Wki ) = U (j, Wkj ) for all i, j = 1, ..., n and for all k = a, b, c.
By acceptance, there exist positive numbers αi and numbers β i and numbers
Ka , Kb , Kc such that:
Ka = αi vi (Wai ) + β i , Kb = αi v i (Wbi ) + β i and Kc = αi v i (Wci ) + β i for all i.
We immediately have by subtracting these equations from each other:
Kb − Ka
vi (W i ) − v i (Wai )
for all i,
= i bi
Kc − Ka
v (Wc ) − v i (Wai )
which contradicts (11).
Proof of Theorem 2
Let {v 1 , v 2 , ..., v n , W , R} be a risk-isomorphic world. Let {Wai }ni=1 and

{Wbi }ni=1 be two equal-welfare distributions of wealth such that Wbi > Wai .
P
Let S = {ω = (W 1 , ..., W n ) : ni=1 W i = W }. We denote by Ω the set of
allocations selected by the basic procedure (6), i.e.,
( n
)
X 1 v i (W i ) − vi (W i )
a
Ω = arg max
· i i
: ω = (W 1 , ..., W n )
i (W i )
ω∈S
n
v
(W
)
−
v
a
b
i=1

Fix k ∈ {1, ..., n} and consider the set:
( n
)
X
v k (σ ki (W i )) : ω = (W 1 , ..., W n ) ,
Ωk = arg max
ω∈S

i=1

where σki (W i ) denotes the wealth that k requires to reach the same level of
b the set of allocations
welfare as i achieves with wealth W i . Denote by Ω
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b is average of the sets Ωk .
selected by the general procedure (8). Then, Ω

Formally,

b=
Ω

( n
X1
k=1

n

· ω k : ωk ∈ Ωk

)

,

Claim. Ω = Ωk for all k ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Proof of the claim. Denote generically ω = (W 1 , ..., W n ) and fix k ∈

{1, ..., n}. By definition, (i, W i )I(k, σ ki (W i )) for all i = {1, ..., n}. Now, by

the definition of risk-isomorphism, it follows that

vi (W i ) − v i (Wai )
vk (σ ki (W i )) − vk (Wak )
=
, for all i = {1, ..., n}.
vi (Wbi ) − v i (Wai )
vk (Wbk ) − vk (Wak )
Thus,
n
X
vi (W i ) − v i (W i )
i=1

vi (Wbi ) −

a
v i (Wai )

=

n
X
vk (σ k (W i )) − vk (W k )
i

i=1

a

vk (Wbk ) − vk (Wak )

=λ·

n
X
i=1

v k (σ ki (W i )) − µ,

where
1
vk (Wak )
>
0
and
µ
=
> 0.
vk (Wbk ) − v k (Wak )
vk (Wbk ) − v k (Wak )
P
i
i )−v i (W i )
a
, if and only
Therefore, an allocation ω ∈ S maximizes ni=1 n1 · vvi (W
(Wbi )−v i (Wai )
Pn k k i
if ω maximizes i=1 v (σ i (W )). In other words, ω ∈ Ω ⇐⇒ ω ∈ Ωk . This
λ=

proves the claim.

Case 1: Ω is a singleton set.
If Ω = {ω} then, by the claim, Ω = {ω} = Ωk for all k, and therefore

b = {ω} = Ω. In other words, the general procedure described in (8) would
Ω

select a unique allocation of wealth that would coincide with the allocation
selected by maximizing the utility function in (5).
Case 2: Ω is not a singleton set.
b 18 The converse inclusion is
It is straightforward to show that Ω ⊆ Ω.

also true, provided that we assume all individual vNM utility functions are
18

Note that if ω ∈ Ω then, by the claim, ω ∈ Ωk for all k = {1, ..., n} and ω =
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1
n·

Pn

k=1

ω.

b Then, ω =
concave. Formally, let ω ∈ Ω.

1
n

·

Pn

k=1

ω k , for some ω k ∈ Ωk .

Since Ω = Ωk for all k = 1, ..., n, then ω k ∈ Ω for all k = 1, ..., n. Now, if all

individual vNM utility functions are concave, it follows that Ω is a convex
set and therefore ω ∈ Ω.19

19

Note that, had we defined the general procedure (8) by selecting any convex combina-

tion (not necessarily with equal weights).of the wealth distributions maximizing (7), the
theorem would also hold.
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